This paper is concerned with a kind of stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information. Here the term "overlapping" means that the follower's and the leader's information have some joint part, while they have no inclusion relation. Optimal controls of the follower and the leader's are proved by the stochastic maximum principle, the direct calculation of the derivative of the cost functional and stochastic filtering. A new system of Riccati equations is introduced to represent the state feedback of the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy.
Introduction
The stochastic Stackelberg differential game has been an active research area recently, due to not only its distinct characteristic and basic importance in stochastic optimal control and differential game theory, but also its wide applications in financial economics and management engineering. The Stackelberg differential game is also known as leaderfollower differential game, which can be traced to the pioneering work by Stackelberg [9] in static competitive economics. Then Simann and Cruz [8] studied the dynamic/differential linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg game, and the Stackelberg strategy was expressed in terms of Riccatilike differention equations. Bagchi and Basar [1] investigated an LQ stochastic Stackelberg differential game, where the diffusion term of the Itô-type state equation does not contain the state and control variables. Existence and uniqueness of the solution are established, and the leader's optimal strategy is shown to satisfy a particular integral equation. Yong [13] obtained a rather general result in the LQ stochastic leader-follower differential game, where the coefficients could be random matrices, the control variables could enter the diffusion term of the state equation and the weight matrices for the controls in the cost functionals need not to be positive definite. Øksendal et al. [4] proved a maximum principle for a Stackelberg differential game with Itô-Lévy process, and found applications to a continuous time newsvendor problem. Bensoussan et al. [2] researched a stochastic Stackelberg differential game in several informa-tion structures, whereas the diffusion term does not contain the control variables. Xu and Zhang [11] , Xu et al. [12] addressed both stochastic leader-follower difference and differential two-player games with time delay. By introducing a new costate, which captures the future information of the control, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the game was presented. The optimal strategy was designed in terms of three decoupled and symmetric Riccati equations, which is helpful in computation.
However, the above literatures do not consider the feature of asymmetric information in Stackelberg differential game, which we believe, to the best knowledge, that it is a nature and important feature from the point of view of theory and applications. In fact, for example, in the non-zero sum velocity-controlled pursuit-evasion game of [8] , the pursuer's information is always later in time than that of the evader's, which is in some sense of time asymmetry. And in the newsvendor problem of [4] , the manufacturer and the retailer face different environments in the market. Thus naturally they possess asymmetric information, which are represented by different σ-algebras. From the mathematical point of view, when the game problems with asymmetric information are studied, stochastic optimal control problems with partial information are often encountered, which are important and rather technically demanding. Shi et el. [6] first solved a stochastic leader-follower differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader. Stochastic maximum principles and verification theorems with partial information were obtained, and an LQ stochastic leader-follower differential game with noisy observation was solved via measure transformation, stochastic filtering and conditional mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equation (CMFFBSDE), where not all the diffusion coefficients contain the state and control variables. In a companion paper by Shi et al. [7] , we studied an LQ stochastic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information, where the control variables enter both diffu-Proceedings of the 36th Chinese Control Conference July 26-28, 2017, Dalian, China sion coefficients of the state equation. It is also required that the information available to the follower is a sub-σ-algebra of the one of the leader. By maximum principle and optimal filtering of Xiong [10] , a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is given. Shi and Wang [5] researched another kind of LQ leader-follower stochastic differential game, where the information available to the leader is a sub-σalgebra of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motion. Other related work, see Chang and Xiao [3] .
In this paper, we consider a kind of stochastic LQ Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information. Here the term "overlapping" means that the follower's and the leader's information have some joint part, while they have no inclusion relation. To the best of our knowledge, this information structure is not studied in the literature. Specifically, the system noise is described by three independent Brownian motions W 1 t , W 2 t , W 3 t , the information of the follower comes from the filtration generated by W 1 t , W 3 t while the information of the leader comes from the filtration generated by W 2 t , W 3 t . This is more suitable to illustrate some game problems with asymmetric information. In this paper, the problem of the follower is solved by the stochastic maximum principle with partial information, while the problem of the leader is solved by a direct calculation of the derivative of the cost functional and stochastic filtering of Xiong [10] . The state feedback representation of the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is given via the double-dimension technique of Yong [13] and a new system of Riccati equations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the problem studied in this paper is formulated. In Section 3, the follower's and the leader's problem are solved in sequence. And the optimal Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is derived. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
Problem Formulation
We consider a finite time duration T > 0 and a complete probability space (Ω, F, P), on which a three-dimensional standard Brownian motion
We consider the scalar state process x u 1 ,u 2 which satisfies the linear stochastic differential equation
(1) Here u 1 is the follower's control process and u 2 is the leader's control process, which are both scalar-valued; A 0 , B 0 , C 0 , A 1 , A 2 , A 3 are constants. We define the admissible control sets as follows.
Here G i t σ{W i s , W 3 s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, i = 1, 2 denotes the information of the follower and the leader, respectively.
We formulate the problem by two steps. In step 1, for any chosen u 2 , the follower wishes to select a u 1 * ∈ U 1 to minimize the cost functional
Here Q 1 , G 1 ≥ 0, N 1 = 0 are constants. In step 2, after the follower's optimal control u 1 * is announced, the leader would like to choose a u 2 * ∈ U 2 to minimize
where Q 2 , G 2 ≥ 0, N 2 = 0 are constants. Noting that the information of the leader and the follower have overlapping part. We refer to the above problem as a stochastic LQ Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information.
If such a control process pair (u 1 * , u 2 * ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 exists, we call it a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy.
Main Results
In this section, we deal with the problems of the follower and the leader in two subsections, respectively. For any F t -adapted process ξ, we denote byξ
its optimal filtering estimates in the sense of Xiong [10] .
Problem of The Follower
First, we seek the necessary conditions for the optimal control of the follower. For given control u 2 , we assume that there exists a G 1 t -adapted optimal control u 1 * of the follower, and the corresponding optimal state is x u 1 * ,u 2 . Let us define the follower's Hamiltonian function
The partial information maximum principle (see, e.g., Proposition 2.1 of [6] ) yields that
where the F t -adapted process quadruple (q, k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ) satisfies the adjoint backward SDE (BSDE)
Taking clue from the terminal condition, we wish to find
for some deterministic and differentiable function P t , and F t -adapted process ϕ which admits the BSDE
In the above equation, α, β 1 , β 3 are all F t -adapted processes. Applying Itô's formula to (8) , we get
Comparing (10) with (7), we have
and
Taking E[·|G 1 t ] on both sides of (8), (11) and (12), we get
(15) Applying Lemma 5.4 in [10] to (1) corresponding to u 1 * and (7) with E[·|G 1 t ], we derive the optimal filtering equation
(16) Putting (13) into (6), we get
Substituting (13), (14) and (17) into (15), we obtain the standard Riccati equation
(18) It admits a unique differentiable solution P t , and
Applying Lemma 5.4 in [10] again to the BSDE (9), together with the forward equation in (16), we have
x u 1 ,u 2 0 = x0,φT = 0.
(20)
For given u 2 , by the standard BSDE theory (20) admits a unique G 1 t -adapted solution quadruple (x u 1 * ,u 2 ,φ,β 1 ,β 3 ). Thus from (13) and (14), the solvability of the optimal filtering equation (16) can be guaranteed and the optimal control u 1 * of the follower is uniquely expressed as (17).
Moreover, it is easily to check that the concavity/convexity conditions in the verification theorem (refer to Proposition 2.2 of [6] ) hold, then u 1 * given by (17) is really optimal. We summarize the above deducting process in the following theorem. Theorem 3.1 Let P t satisfy (18). For chosen u 2 of the leader, u 1 * defined by (17) is a feedback optimal control of the follower, where (x u 1 *  ,u 2 ,φ,β 1 ,β 3 ) is the unique G 1 tadapted solution to (20).
Problem of The Leader
In the sequel, the leader keeps in mind that the follower takes u 1 * by (17), thus his state equation writes
The problem of the leader is to select a G 2 t -adapted optimal control u 2 * such that the cost functional
is minimized.
Suppose that there exists a G 2 t -adapted optimal control u 2 * of the leader, and his optimal state is (x * ,φ * ,β 1 * ,β 3 * ) ≡ (x u 2 * ,φ * ,β 1 * ,β 3 * ). Next, we will derive the necessary conditions for u 2 * , by a direct calculation of the derivative of the cost functional. We define the leader's Hamiltonian function
where the F t -adapted process quadruple (p, y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) satisfies the adjoint equation
Without loss of generality, let x 0 ≡ 0, and define the perturbed optimal control u 2 * +εu 2 for sufficiently small ε > 0, with scalar-valued u 2 . Then it is easy to see from the linear-ity of (21), that the solution to it is x * + εx u 2 . First we have
Applying Itô's formula to y t x u 2 t −p tφt , noting (21) and (24), we derive
This implies that
In the sequel, we will derive the filtering equation fory andp. Applying again Lemma 5.4 in [10] to (24) and (21) corresponding to u 2 * with E[·|G 2 t ], we obtain the optimal filtering equation ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
